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Abstract: Although linked historically by Rowan et al., the scientific study of animal sentience
and political campaigns to improve animal welfare should be kept separate, for at least two
reasons. First, the separation makes it clear that standards of evidence acceptable for ethical
or political decisions on animal welfare can be lower than those required for a rigorously
scientific approach to animal sentience. Second, it helps to avoid confirmatory bias in the form
of giving undue weight to results that are in line with pre-conceived ideas and political views.
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1. Science and politics
Animal sentience – particularly the capacity to feel pain – is so closely tied up with the ethics
of how we should treat animals that it is easy to think that a scientific evaluation of the
evidence for animal sentience is the same as an ethical evaluation of animal welfare itself.
But they are not the same. The belief that non-human animals are sentient – that is, capable
of consciously experiencing suffering, pain and pleasure - is of, course, the reason many
people believe that animal welfare is important (Singer, 1975, 1990; Duncan, 1981, 1996;
Dawkins, 1990; Mellor, 2019). However, the question of whether animals are sentient is a
factual matter while the question of how sentient beings should be treated is a matter of
ethics and policy-making. One is a question of science (what is the case), the other is a
question of morality and politics (what we ought to do about it). They can and should be dealt
with quite differently. Whereas Rowan et al. (2021) tie the two together in a valuable
historical overview, their target article blurs this distinction in a way that is potentially
misleading.
The reason the science of animal sentience and the politics of animal welfare need to be kept
separate (while acknowledging their obvious links) is that they raise two different questions
that have to be answered in very different ways. The process of arriving at a scientific
conclusion involves looking at all the available evidence and evaluating every single one of
the objections that have been raised. If there is evidence that does not quite fit a current
hypothesis, it needs to be investigated, not ignored. Scientists are not (or should not be) afraid
to say “We don’t know”. In the case of animal sentience, there is a great deal we do not know
(Carruthers, 2019; Dawkins, 2012, 2021).
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The process of arriving at a political policy, on the other hand, often means ignoring doubts
even to the point of being impatient with scientists who keep emphasizing the uncertainties
of what is known. Many people are already so convinced that animals are sentient beings that
they see no need to wait for any more evidence before wanting laws and regulations to
protect them. In other words, the standards of evidence for political decisions can be much
lower than those in science. Birch (2017) made this view explicit by proposing the Animal
Sentience Precautionary Principle or ASPP, as follows:
“ASPP: Where there are threats of serious, negative animal welfare outcomes, lack of full
scientific certainty as to the sentience of the animals in question shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent those outcomes.”

Birch justifies this use of uncertain evidence on the grounds that errors due to wrongly
assuming lack of sentience in animals who are sentient are far more serious than errors due
to wrongly assuming sentience in animals that are not. It is important to note here, however,
that this is an ethical judgement, not a scientific one. Birch is advocating a lower standard of
evidence for political decisions than for scientific ones, but the view that animals should be
given the benefit of the doubt in the face of uncertainty about their sentience does not make
it factually more likely that they actually are sentient. It simply reduces the strength of
scientific evidence that is considered necessary in the moral calculus of how to treat animals.
It is in this light that recent ‘declarations’ about animal sentience discussed by Rowan et al.
should be seen, not as the last word on conclusions reached with the highest scientific
standards but as statements to the effect that, in the view of certain people, enough is now
known for policy-makers to go ahead and pass legislation on the basis of lower standards of
evidence. For example, the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (2012) states:
“non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological
substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors... Nonhuman animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including
octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.”

This goes way beyond what the scientific evidence currently shows us. We do not actually
understand what the ‘neurological substrates that generate consciousness’ are in any animal,
human or non-human (Koch et al., 2016; Blackmore and Troscianko, 2018), and we certainly
have no way of showing that these are present in octopuses. The declaration is thus a leap of
faith, not a statement of scientific fact. And declaring something to be true beyond the
available evidence does not constitute more evidence.
2. Politics and confirmational bias
There is another danger in bringing political views about animal welfare into scientific
discussions about animal sentience, which is the damage this can do to science itself. As it is,
scientific results are already threatened by various kinds of potential confirmational biases
(giving more weight to facts that support what is already believed than to facts that go against
it; Nickerson, 1998; IoannidIs et al, 2014, Bishop 2019). The last thing the scientific study of
animal sentience needs is yet another bias in the form of pressure to give the benefit of the
doubt to uncertain evidence on the grounds that to do so would strengthen the argument for
giving more legal protection to animals or because it is in line with the views of a campaigning
organization.
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To maintain the scientific integrity of the study of animal sentience, therefore, it is more than
ever important to maintain the distinction between science and policy-making. Both are valid
endeavours in their own right. Both have a place in society; and at their best they feed off
each other by challenging the other’s assumptions. But they are different processes, with
different aims, different criteria for success or failure and, crucially, very different views about
standards of evidence.
In fact, science and policy-making are so different that it is quite possible to believe (as I do)
that, morally, animals should be given the benefit of the doubt and their welfare should be
protected, whilst also believing, at the same time, that scientifically, doubts should be given
no benefits whatsoever and that every uncertainty should be uncovered and fully
investigated. There is nothing contradictory about accepting lower standards of evidence for
ethical or policy decisions than we do for scientific facts. What is unacceptable is to pretend
that we know more than we do about animal sentience because it would fit better with what
is believed already or would lend support to a political campaign. It is a matter of scientific
integrity not to claim more than the evidence shows.
3. Conclusions
As Rowan et al. show, ‘weight of evidence’ and ‘benefit of the doubt’ arguments are
increasingly accepted as good enough for answering the ethical question of animal sentience,
namely, ‘how ought sentient beings to be treated?’. But the more scientific questions such as
which animals are sentient, how sentience arises from nervous tissue, how it evolved – these
questions still remain to be answered. Finding answers to them will not be helped by asserting
at the outset that this or that animal is sentient because the European Union or the UK
Parliament has declared that they are. If we really want to understand animal sentience, we
need to maintain scientific rigour, and that means emphasizing what we do not know and
resisting the temptation to confuse moral with scientific certainty. Evidence-based policy is a
desirable goal but policy-based evidence is not.
It is one thing to declare that animals are sentient, persuade people to sign petitions that they
are, and, with enough public support, get this into legislation. But we should not confuse the
standards of evidence that are necessary to make progress in that most difficult of all subjects
– sentience – with the much lower standards of evidence that can satisfy the public or policy
makers. Rowan et al. have made an important contribution to the parallel histories of animal
sentience and animal welfare but by appearing to want to reduce scientific standards in the
interests of their own ethical and political views, they have done a disservice to science and
blurred an important distinction between science and politics.
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